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Abstract 
We examine the relationship between managerial optimism and debt conservatism (i.e. the 
low-leverage puzzle). Our analysis demonstrates that optimistic tone, our time-varying 
optimism measure, significantly decreases leverage. This evidence supports the proposition 
that optimistic managers who consider external financing as unduly costly use debt 
conservatively. This reduced reliance on external financing can be explained by our further 
evidence that optimistic tone significantly increases cash holdings and decreases dividend 
payment. The negative tone-leverage relation is stronger in the presence of high insider 
purchase of own stocks which confirms that optimistic tone reflects managerial optimism. 
This study suggests that managerial optimism can help explain the low-leverage puzzle.  
Keywords: managerial optimism, debt conservatism, cash, dividend, tone analysis, insider 
trading.  
JEL classification: G30, G32, G02 
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1. Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller, many studies have built upon the trade-off 
theory and the pecking order theory to examine the effects of various firm and industry 
characteristics on firm capital structure (see e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009). Recent literature 
highlights the significance of managers’ personality traits in determining capital structure (see 
e.g., Malmendier et al., 2011), which we build on. However, an unresolved puzzle in the 
literature is that many companies have low leverage and in particular that debt levels are often 
lower than the optimal level (see Graham, 2000). A growing literature suggests that 
managerial biases (e.g. overconfidence) play a significant role in explaining corporate 
policies.1 Our paper primarily contributes to the literature by demonstrating that time-varying 
managerial optimism2, a well-documented bias in social psychology (e.g., Weinstein, 1980) 
and often considered as a particular form of overconfidence (Moore and Healy, 2008)3, can 
help explain this low-leverage puzzle. Specifically, we provide evidence that time-varying 
managerial optimism, associated with the overestimation of firm actual performance, is 
                                            
1 Prior literature suggests that managerial overconfidence, broadly speaking, is relevant to a wide range of 
finance and accounting issues including firm investment (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Goel and Thakor, 2008), 
acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2008); innovation (Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh, 2012), managerial turnover 
(Campbell et al., 2011), managerial earnings forecasts (Hilary and Hsu, 2011; Libby and Rennekamp, 2012; 
Hribar and Yang, 2016), accounting fraud (Schrand and Zechman, 2012), and fund manager performance 
(Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012), among others. Similar to these studies, we investigate what happens inside the firm 
when managers are rational except for how they perceive the firm performance.  
2 In this paper, we study the effect of optimism, one of the most widely studied forms of overconfidence in 
psychology. According to Moore and Healy (2008), there are three major forms of overconfidence, namely (1) 
overestimation of one’s actual performance, or chance of success, (2) excessive precision in one’s belief (i.e. 
miscalibration), and (3) overplacement of one’s performance relative to others, and around 64% and 31% of the 
empirical studies focus on the first two forms respectively. We use the term optimism throughout the paper, 
rather than a broader term overconfidence, because the relevant studies discussed in this paper also largely focus 
on this particular form of overconfidence. 
3 Overconfidence and optimism, although often used interchangeably in the finance and accounting literature, are 
two related but distinct concepts (Hilary et al., 2016). Hackbarth (2008) defines optimism as the overestimation 
of earnings growth, while overconfidence is defined as the underestimation of earnings volatility. Optimism can 
be considered as one form of overconfidence. Malmendier et al. (2011) define the “type of overconfidence” 
analysed in their paper as “the overestimation of mean future cash flows”, and use the term “overconfidence” to 
refer to this particular managerial bias which is in fact optimism according to Hackbarth (2008); however they 
also recognize that “a different behavioral bias sometimes referred to as “overconfidence” is the underestimation 
of variance” (Malmendier et al., 2011, p. 1688). Therefore, we use the term, optimism, when we discuss 
Malmendier et al.’s (2011) study in this paper. 
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robustly negatively related to leverage, suggesting that optimistic managers tend to use debt 
conservatively.  
        The role of managerial optimism in determining firms’ capital structure receives 
considerable attention in the academic literature (see e.g., Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008; 
Malmendier et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2013). Recent theoretical literature, which we discuss 
briefly in Section 2, suggests that managerial optimism may either increase or decrease 
leverage. For example, Hackbarth (2008) extends the trade-off theory to show that optimistic 
managers who overestimate earnings growth use more debt compared to rational managers. In 
contrast, Malmendier et al. (2011) suggest managerial optimism4, which is associated with the 
overestimation of mean returns to investment or future cash flows, can result in conservative 
debt usage because optimistic managers overestimate the external financing costs and prefer 
internal financing. Thus, managerial optimism has the potential to explain the low-leverage 
puzzle (see e.g., Graham, 2002). Overall, the link between managerial optimism and capital 
structure is ultimately an empirical matter, which our paper seeks to address (Malmendier et 
al., 2011).  
        Empirically, Malmendier et al. (2011) provide evidence on the relation between 
managerial optimism and leverage. Their empirical analysis is based mainly on a time-
invariant option-based optimism measure that captures managers’ tendency to hold their in-
the-money options too long. To control for firm fixed effects, Malmendier et al. (2011) 
compare leverage under different CEOs operating the same firm and find that optimistic 
managers choose higher leverage than their rational predecessors or successors. Graham et al. 
(2013) examine the relation between the survey-based optimism measures and leverage. They, 
however, do not control for firm fixed effects.  
                                            
4 As explained in footnote 3, we use the term, optimism, to describe the type of managerial overconfidence 
analyzed in Malmendier et al. (2011).  
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        The key difference in approach between this study and the above literature is that we use 
a set of time-varying managerial words-based measures of optimism and control for firm 
fixed effects. Our emphasis on time-varying measures of optimism is important because the 
optimism level of corporate managers who take too much credit for good firm performance 
may increase over time. This phenomenon is called “dynamic over-optimism” meaning that 
“managers are made (rather than just born) over-optimistic and specifically “managerial over-
optimism should increase after a series of successes” (Hilary et al., 2016, p. 47). Seligman 
(2006, p. 207), the founder of positive psychology who proposes the idea of “learned 
optimism” in 1990, argues that “pessimists can learn the skills of optimism … Even optimists 
can benefit from learning how to change. Almost all optimists have periods of at least mild 
pessimism”. This suggests that people can learn to become more optimistic, and optimism can 
be time-varying. Thus, it is important to capture the inter-temporal variations in managerial 
optimism in order to assess the significance of this important personality trait on capital 
structure.  
        Our words-based measures of optimism are constructed using computational content 
analysis of the tone of UK Chairman’s Statement in the annual report. It is recognized that 
language may reflect certain psychological biases of the speaker in general (Garrard et al., 
2014) and content analysis of corporate disclosures can be conducted to measure management 
behavioural characteristics in particular (Li, 2010a). Our tone-based measure is based on the 
idea that optimistic tone may reflect “a manager-specific tendency to be optimistic or 
pessimistic” (Davis et al., 2015, p. 639). This idea is well supported by the psychology 
literature that suggests that optimists and pessimists are different in the way they cope with 
adversity (Scheier et al., 1986; Carver et al., 1989). Specifically, optimism is often associated 
with certain coping strategies, including the “positive reframing” of coping situations in terms 
of their most positive aspects (Scheier et al., 1994; Carver and Scheier, 2002). Optimism is 
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also associated with positive thinking that is the tendency to “see the best in bad situations” 
and less focus on “the negative aspects of their experience” (Carver and Scheier, 2002, p. 
235-236). We thus expect that an optimistic manager tends to use more positive words and 
fewer negative words. To ensure the validity of our tone measures, we construct composite 
tone index using principal component analysis, which consists of four individual measures of 
optimistic tone (see Section 3.1.1).  
        This study has two major findings. First, optimistic tone is negatively related to leverage, 
suggesting that managerial optimism can lead to conservative debt policy. This finding is in 
line with our further evidence that optimistic tone has a positive effect on cash holdings and a 
negative effect on dividend payment, which can be attributed to optimistic managers’ 
reluctance to use external financing. This additional evidence suggests that the reason why 
firms with optimistic managers have lower leverage can be that these firms hold more cash 
and pay lower dividend and thus rely less on external financing. Our further analysis confirms 
that the negative tone-leverage relation is not driven by information asymmetry, impression 
management or financial constraints.  
        Second, we explore whether managers’ words are consistent with their actions. This 
helps us to distinguish between the managerial optimism and impression management 
interpretations of tone.5 We find interesting moderating effects of insider (especially CEOs) 
trading on the relation between optimistic tone and leverage. Our analysis shows that insider 
purchases enhance the negative tone-leverage relation, which corroborates our argument that 
optimistic tone reflects managerial optimism. In contrast, insider selling weakens the negative 
tone-leverage relation. We posit that when insider selling contradicts optimistic tone, it 
indicates that managers are not as optimistic as their words suggest. In this case, managerial 
                                            
5 Our research design is, to some extent, similar to Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) who focus on the direct 
effect of disclosure tone on shareholder litigation and then examine whether insider trading modifies this 
relationship. 
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optimistic tone may instead be reflecting managers’ intention to manipulate investors’ 
perception of firm performance (i.e. impression management).  
        This study primarily contributes to the capital structure literature by providing evidence 
that suggests that optimistic tone is a significant determinant of leverage. Specifically, we 
provide evidence that time-varying managerial optimism leads to lower leverage, controlling 
for firm fixed effects. This evidence supports Malmendier et al.’s (2011) proposition that debt 
conservatism may be caused by managerial optimism, which sheds light on the low-leverage 
puzzle. In addition, we contribute to the growing literature on managerial optimism by 
developing a time-varying measure of managerial optimism using computational tone analysis. 
Using a time-varying measure of optimism makes it easier to control for firm fixed effects, 
which could impact both managerial optimism and corporate policies. Thus, in turn, it 
mitigates the potential endogeneity problem that is apparent in time-invariant measures of 
optimism. 
        In addition, our study is related to the literature on the interaction between disclosure 
tone and insider trading. We explore the empirical implications of the inconsistency between 
managerial words and actions, which helps us to distinguish between the managerial 
optimism and impression management interpretations of tone.6 In a different setting, Rogers, 
Buskirk and Zechman (2011) examine the interaction between optimistic tone of earnings 
announcements and insider trading in the context of shareholder litigation. They document 
that litigation risk is higher when managers use optimistic language and engage in insider 
selling, because insider selling signals managers’ intent to mislead investors using optimistic 
language. Similar to Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011), we examine when insider trading 
conflicts with disclosure tone, which we interpret as impression management, then the tone-
leverage relationship is weakened. However, when insider trading confirms disclosure tone, 
                                            
6 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting we consider this issue in more depth. 
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then the tone-leverage relationship is intensified, consistent with the managerial optimism 
interpretation. Overall, our study contributes to the literature by suggesting that corporate 
disclosure tone may reveal managerial optimism which in turn can explain corporate 
financing decisions. 
        We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews alternative explanations of optimistic tone and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our measures of managerial optimism and the 
sample. Section 4 discusses main results and their alternative interpretations. Section 5 
conducts further analysis and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Disclosure Tone and Hypotheses 
This section first provides a brief overview of various alternative interpretations of corporate 
disclosure tone and then develops the link between tone and leverage from a managerial 
optimism perspective. Finally, we show the joint effects of managers’ tone and actions 
(measured by directors’ insider trading) on leverage.  
 
2.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TONE - AN OVERVIEW  
A growing body of accounting and finance literature examines the tone (i.e. the use of 
optimistic/pessimistic or positive/negative language) of various corporate disclosures 
including Managerial Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) (e.g., Li, 2010b; Feldman et al., 
2010; Davies and Tama-Sweet, 2012; Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2014), earnings press releases 
(e.g., Henry, 2008; Davis, Piger and Sedor, 2012; Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2014; Henry and 
Leone, 2016; Hilary et al., 2016), and earnings conference calls (e.g., Price et al., 2012; 
Larker and Zakolyukina, 2012; Davis et al., 2015; Lee, Hwang and Chen, 2017). Specifically, 
this line of literature examines whether the tone of various corporate disclosures is associated 
with, for example, cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts (Kothari, Li and 
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Short, 2009), shareholder litigation (Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman, 2011), financial 
misreporting (Larker and Zakolyukina, 2012), earnings quality (Li, 2010b), and market 
pricing (e.g., Henry, 2008; Li, 2010b; Feldman et al., 2010; Davis, Piger and Sedor, 2012). 7  
        However, the effects of disclosure tone on corporate financial decisions remain a 
neglected area of research. Although investors may interpret disclosure tone as containing 
value-relevant soft information, previous studies suggest that disclosure tone might be used to 
(i) “inform” investors and thus reduce information asymmetry, (ii) “intentionally misinform” 
investors by managers who want to manipulate investors’ impression, or (iii) “unintentionally 
misinform” investors by irrational managers whose words and/or actions are likely to be 
driven by their optimism bias. As shown in Figure 1, disclosure tone is subject to three major 
alternative interpretations from information asymmetry, impression management and 
optimism perspectives respectively. 8  
 
 Inform  
Investors 
Misinform  
Investors 
Intentionally Reducing information 
asymmetry 
Impression 
management (“hyping”) 
Unintentionally  Driven by  
managerial bias (e.g. 
optimism) 
 
Figure 1. Alternative interpretations of corporate disclosure tone 
 
2.1.1 Information asymmetry perspective: “inform investors” 
Positive disclosure tone can be interpreted as “incremental information” (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2011), which “informs” investors and therefore reduces information asymmetry 
                                            
7 See table 1 in Li (2010a) and table 3 in Kearney and Liu (2014) for a summary of the studies on various 
implications of corporate disclosures. More recently, Loughran and McDonald (2016) provide an review of 
contemporary textual analysis in accounting and finance.  
8  See Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2011) for a comprehensive review on various explanations of narrative 
disclosures and a conceptual framework of impression management. They provide four explanations for 
corporate disclosure, namely incremental information, impression management, hubris and retrospective sense-
making.  
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between managers and investors. This information asymmetry interpretation of tone is based 
on the assumption that investors are rational and are able to undo reporting bias. Considering 
that reporting bias will reduce stock price performance and managerial reputation (Baginski et 
al., 2000), managers therefore have no incentive to engage in biased reporting. Lang and 
Lundholm (2000) investigate voluntary disclosure activities around equity offerings and their 
impacts on stock prices. They find that firms with a consistent level of disclosure experience 
relatively smaller price declines at the announcement date. This is because disclosure reduces 
information cost associated with equity offering. Furthermore, Kothari, Li and Short (2009) 
find that positive management disclosure is negatively related to equity cost of capital and 
return volatility, which supports the view that disclosures can mitigate information 
asymmetry9 (see e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  
 
2.1.2 Impression management perspective: “intentionally misinform investors” 
Disclosure tone can also be regarded as a form of impression management whereby managers 
attempt to “intentionally misinform” investors or manipulate investors’ perception of firm 
performance. More specifically, impression management can be caused by agency problems 
between managers and investors where biased reporting is a strategic choice of self-interested 
managers to maximize their personal wealth (e.g., Adelberg, 1979; Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007). Moreover, impression management may be used as another mechanism (in 
addition to “reducing information asymmetry”) to reduce the cost of equity, namely “hyping” 
(Lang and Lundholm, 2000). Empirically, Lang and Lundholm (2000) document that firms 
with a considerable increase of disclosure in the six months before the equity offering 
experience price increase prior to the equity offering. However, those firms have much larger 
                                            
9 In particular, positive/favourable disclosures are associated with market makers’ favourable evaluation of firm 
future value and risk, which in turn reduce the transaction cost of equity (i.e. adverse-selection component of the 
bid-ask spread).  
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negative returns at and subsequent to the announcement. This observation is consistent with 
the proposition that disclosure is used to “hype the stock”.  
 
2.1.3 Managerial optimism: “unintentionally misinform investors” 
From the behavioural/psychological perspective, optimistic disclosure tone can be a product 
of managerial optimism/hubris (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2011). In this case, irrational 
managers “unintentionally misinform” investors. However, this behavioural interpretation of 
tone is largely neglected by existing literature of corporate disclosure (Brennan and Conroy, 
2013). Amernic and Craig (2007) emphasize the importance of monitoring excessive 
narcissist-like language used by narcissist CEOs in their letters to shareholders. Several 
studies report evidence of cognitive bias detected using manual and computational linguistic 
analysis of corporate disclosures. For example, Craig and Amernic (2011) detect destructive 
narcissism of CEOs of Enron, Starbucks and General Motors based on CEO’s letter to 
shareholders. In a similar vein, Brennan and Conroy (2013) also conduct manual content 
analysis of narratives in bank CEO letters to shareholders to reveal CEO personality traits (e.g. 
narcissism, hubris, CEO-attribution). Furthermore, computational content analysis of earnings 
press releases (Hilary et al., 2016) and CEO tweets and earnings conference calls (Lee, 
Hwang and Chen, 2017) is employed to measure managerial optimism. Davis et al. (2015) 
examine the effect of managerial style on the tone of earnings conference calls. This body of 
recent evidence supports the notion that tone used in corporate disclosures is potentially 
influenced by unintentional, manager-specific tendencies 10  to be overly optimistic or 
pessimistic (Davis et al., 2015). From this perspective, optimistic tone can be regarded as a 
proxy for managerial optimism. Li (2010a, p. 157) suggests that one of the promising areas of 
corporate disclosures research lies in “measuring management (behavioral) characteristics and 
                                            
10 It is considered as managerial bias that is closely related to their personalities, experience and values (Davis, 
Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang, 2015).  
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examining their implications for corporate policies”. Our study thus makes an important 
contribution by examining whether leverage is robustly related to optimistic tone and if this 
can help explain the low leverage puzzle; this adds considerably to the under-researched 
behavioural perspective of disclosure tone.  
 
2.2 TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
2.2.1 Standard theories of corporate financing  
The trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963) and pecking order theory (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984) are two predominant theories of financing decisions. The standard trade-off 
theory suggests that financing decisions are based on the trade-off between tax benefits and 
bankruptcy costs of debt financing, which implies that there is an optimal leverage where the 
marginal benefits of debt equal its marginal costs. Pecking order theory posits that there is a 
preference for internal over external financing and if internal financing is not sufficient debt is 
preferred to equity. This is because internal financing is subject to zero information cost, 
while equity is more likely to be undervalued by outside investors and has higher information 
cost than debt. Much effort has been devoted to run empirical horse races between these two 
competing theories.  
        However, these two traditional approaches to capital structure are not particularly useful 
for understanding some of the important puzzles in the literature. One such puzzle is the low-
leverage puzzle, which refers to the stylized fact that firms often maintain relatively low debt 
levels (see e.g., Graham, 2000; Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). This empirical pattern is 
puzzling because it contradicts the prediction of the trade-off theory that firms should use 
more debt to take tax benefits especially when firm’s leverage is below its optimal level. 
Moreover, from the pecking order perspective, low-leverage firms should use equity even 
more conservatively. This prediction is however often inconsistent with the empirical 
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evidence and this theory often fails to account for many important determinants of leverage 
(Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Thus, Graham (2000) conclude that both 
theories fail to provide a complete explanation for the low-leverage puzzle.  
        The limited explanatory power of the standard theories can be partly attributed to a strict 
assumption that managers are not subject to any behavioural biases. Our subsequent 
discussion focuses on the role of a well-documented psychological bias, namely managerial 
optimism, in a firm’s financing decision. This important managerial trait is often neglected in 
the standard capital structure literature. We contribute to the literature by empirically testing 
two competing hypotheses on the relationship between managerial optimism and leverage, 
which in turn may help explain debt conservatism. Our main hypotheses are based on 
behavioural finance models that relate managerial optimism to financing decisions (Heaton, 
2002; Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011).  
 
2.2.2 Optimistic tone and leverage 
This section first develops the link between optimistic tone, a proxy for managerial optimism, 
and firm’s leverage, and then discusses the interaction effects between insider trading patterns 
and optimistic tone. According to recent studies (Rogers et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2015), 
optimistic tone reflects “a manager-specific tendency to be optimistic or pessimistic” (Davis 
et al., 2015, p. 639). In other words, as discussed above, optimistic managers may 
unintentionally misinform investors by using more optimistic words in their corporate 
disclosure. Consistent with this argument, Hilary et al. (2016) and Lee, Hwang and Chen 
(2017) conduct tone analysis of managerial statements to gauge optimism of managers. 
Therefore, we believe that optimistic tone is able to capture a particular trait or biased belief 
of managers, namely, optimism. Our hypothesis development thus focuses on the role of this 
particular characteristic of managers (not of firms or markets).  
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        We first discuss the effects of managerial optimism on leverage. On one hand, as pointed 
out by Malmendier et al. (2011), managerial optimism can lead to higher leverage. This is 
because managerial optimism may enhance the preference for debt over equity financing. Put 
differently, optimistic managers, who overestimate the mean returns to investment, tend to 
issue equity even more conservatively than debt. Similarly, an earlier model by Heaton (2002) 
also suggests that optimistic managers, who overestimate the probability of good firm 
performance, believe that equity is undervalued by outside investors and therefore prefer debt 
to equity. Furthermore, from the trade-off perspective, optimistic managers, who overestimate 
the earnings growth, will underestimate financial distress costs associated with debt and hence 
tend to use more debt than their rational counterparts (Hackbarth, 2008). From these 
perspectives, managerial optimism could be positively related to leverage and we have the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Optimistic tone is positively related to leverage. 
 
        In contrast, based on the model by Malmendier et al. (2011), managerial optimism may 
lead to lower level of debt (i.e. debt conservatism) if the firm has sufficient internal finance 
(i.e. retained earnings), which is particularly true because optimistic managers may retain cash 
for future investment. 11 Huang-Meier et al. (2016) find that optimistic managers hold more 
cash than their rational counterparts. Their evidence is consistent with Malmendier et al.’s 
(2011) argument that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external financing and therefore 
hold more cash. In brief, managerial optimism could make the firm forgo tax benefits and 
                                            
11  Another explanation for the negative overconfidence-leverage relation is related to “perceived financing 
costs”. More specifically, overconfident managers tend to overestimate the information costs associated with 
external financing including both debt and equity. In this case, it is possible that overconfident manager’s 
perceived financing costs outweigh investment returns (Malmendier et al., 2011). Consequently, if internal 
financing is not sufficient, overconfident managers are likely to forgo investment opportunities. In brief, 
managerial overconfidence may lead to underinvestment and lower financing needs.  
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therefore be underleveraged relative to the optimal target debt ratio. To empirically examine 
the proposition that managerial optimism may lead to a conservative debt policy, we test the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Optimistic tone is negatively related to leverage. 
 
        To sum up, the theoretical relation between managerial optimism and leverage can be 
either positive or negative (Malmendier et al., 2011) and thus the effect of optimism on 
leverage is an empirical question.  
 
2.2.3 Joint effect of optimistic tone and insider trading on leverage 
Tone can be used to either intentionally or unintentionally misinform investors. To 
empirically distinguish alternative interpretations of tone, we compare managers’ personal 
beliefs about firms’ prospects gauged from their action and words respectively. More 
specifically, we double check managers’ optimistic beliefs as indicated by their optimistic 
tone using their insider trading patterns, which serves as another window into their beliefs. 
The idea is that insider selling may indicate that optimistic tone is used to “hyping the stock”, 
while insider purchase may indicate that optimistic tone is driven by managerial optimism. 
        Specifically, to further distinguish whether managerial words are used to “intentionally 
misinform” and “unintentionally misinform” investors, we investigate the interaction between 
insider trading and tone. In the context of shareholder litigation, Rogers, Buskirk and 
Zechman (2011) find that litigation risk is greater when managers use optimistic language and 
engage in insider selling. This is because insider selling signals managers’ intent to mislead 
investors using optimistic language. Following the same logic, the combination of insider 
purchases and optimistic tone will be stronger evidence of managerial optimism as stated in 
15 
 
hypothesis 2. In contrast, we expect that insider selling that coincides with optimistic tone will 
indicate a tendency to “intentionally misinform” investors (i.e. impression management) as 
stated in hypothesis 3. Therefore, we expect the following moderating effects of insider 
trading on the tone-leverage relation:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The interaction between tone and directors’ purchases will intensify the 
tone-leverage relation, when insider purchase confirms optimistic tone.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The interaction between tone and directors’ sales will weaken the tone-
leverage relation, when insider selling contradicts optimistic tone.  
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
This section first introduces our measures of managerial optimism and then describes our 
sampling procedures and presents summary statistics and correlation analysis.  
 
3.1 MEASUREMENT OF MANAGERIAL OPTIMISM  
The fact that managerial optimism, a well-documented psychological attribute, is 
unobservable and cannot be directly measured makes it challenging to empirically test the 
effect of this theoretically important managerial trait on corporate decisions. Before 
introducing our time-varying measures of managerial optimism, we first briefly discuss the 
limitations of some existing optimism measures and then explain why it is more appropriate 
and beneficial to use a time-varying optimism measure.  
        Empirical studies on managerial optimism often use indirect and more specifically 
“revealed beliefs” measures, in which case optimism is inferred from the observed managerial 
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behaviours and decisions that are potentially driven by their optimism bias (Libby and 
Rennekamp, 2012). Two commonly used indirect measures of optimism developed by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) are based on executive stock options and media portrayal 
respectively. Both option-based and press-based optimism measures are subject to criticisms. 
The option-based measure is based on the idea that optimistic managers tend to exercise their 
in-the-money options too late due to their (biased) belief that the firm stock price will 
continue to increase in the future. However, it is argued that persistent holding of options can 
be affected by “a myriad of economic factors” (Jin and Kothari, 2008) and thus may not only 
reflect managerial optimism. The press-based optimism measure is based on how the business 
press portrays managers. The reliability of the press-based measure is also questionable due to 
the highly subjective nature of the judgements made by journalists (Doukas and Petmezas, 
2007). Previous studies also use survey-based measures (e.g., Graham et al., 2013), which are 
however often costly to construct and are measured at one point in time, which means they 
are poorly suited to investigate time-variation in optimism. 
        It is worth noting that most of the optimism measures used in the prior research are static 
in the sense that optimism is treated as a habitual behaviour. It is, however, plausible that the 
level of managerial optimism can be time-varying. There are both theoretically and 
empirically based reasons for using a time-varying optimism measure. In the positive 
psychology literature, Seligman (2006) proposes the idea of “learned optimism” which 
suggests that even pessimists can learn to become optimists. Hilary et al. (2016, p. 48) study 
dynamic over-optimism and demonstrate that “a representative individual becomes 
dynamically over-optimistic following a series of successes”. This is probably why the studies 
on investor optimism are based on time-varying measures, namely investor sentiment (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2006). In contrast, the existing studies on managerial optimism largely rely on 
static measures. Our empirical analysis is based on time-varying optimism measures. 
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Empirically, an important benefit of having a time-varying optimism measure is that it makes 
it much easier to control for time-invariant firm and/or managerial heterogeneity, which could 
potentially drive both managerial optimism and financing decisions, using fixed effects 
estimators.  
 
3.1.1 Words-based measure of optimism: optimistic tone  
Next, we describe how our measures of managerial optimism are constructed. Our measure of 
managerial optimism is based on tone analysis of the UK Chairman’s Statement12. We use the 
Chairman’s Statement for several reasons. Chairman’s Statement is not heavily regulated. 
Thus, the language used in Chairman’s Statement is much less standard than the UK 
Director’s Report which is subject to regulatory requirements. In addition, disclosure-related 
litigation is rare in the UK relative to the US, and therefore the UK accounting narratives (e.g. 
Chairman’s Statement) are relatively less constrained compared with the MD&A in the US 
10-K filings. Moreover, the existing literature13 seems to agree that Chairman’s Statement is 
an organizational rather than individual communication, meaning that the chief executives 
might also have influences on the choice of language in the Chairman’s Statement. In our 
robustness tests, we construct alternative tone measures using CEO’s Reviews. 
        We construct optimistic tone measures, as proxies for managerial optimism, by counting 
both optimism-increasing and optimism-decreasing words. Koonce et al. (2011, p. 220) argue 
that the optimism bias occurs because “individuals use and interpret facts, reports, events, and 
perceptions according to what they would like to be the case rather than according to the 
                                            
12 Many previous studies on UK accounting narratives focus on Chairman’s Statement (see e.g., Smith and 
Taffler, 2000, Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Clatworthy and Jones, 2006). Smith and Taffler (2000) use 
Chairman’s Statement to predict firm bankruptcy. A more recent study (Schleicher and Walker, 2010) conduct 
manual content analysis of the tone of forward-looking statements (i.e. outlook sections) in the UK annual report 
(most of which are located at the end of Chairman’s Statement). 
13 For example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) argue that accounting narratives such as UK Chairman’s Statement 
allow “management” to describe corporate financial performance. In addition, Schleicher and Walker (2010) 
attribute the bias in the tone of outlook statements to “managers”. In particular, they argue that “managers with a 
willingness to engage in impression management are likely to target forward-looking statements”, while 73.5 
percent of the forward-looking narratives are located in Chairman’s Statement (Schleicher and Walker, 2010). 
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actual evidence”. The psychology literature also suggests that optimism is associated with 
“positive reframing” and “constructive thinking” of the adverse situations and past experience. 
This implies that optimistic managers may focus more on the positive aspects of, and have a 
more positive interpretation and description of, their firms’ performance and environment in 
their corporate disclosures. It is also worth mentioning a cognate of optimism, namely 
“optimistic explanatory style”, which refers to “how people habitually explain the causes of 
events that occur to them” (Peterson and Steen, 2002, p. 244). For instance, Dykema et al. 
(1995) find that people with an optimistic explanatory style tend to see the world as less filled 
with hassles than do the pessimists. It is thus plausible to assume that optimistic managers 
tend to use more positive words and fewer negative words, which is supported by the 
evidence that the tone of optimistic CEOs’ language on Twitter and during earnings 
conference calls is more positive (Lee, Hwang and Chen, 2017).  
        To construct tone-based optimism measures, we use four individual wordlists. Our first 
three wordlists are the same as those in Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) and Davis, Ge, 
Matsumoto and Zhang (2015), namely Optimism, Tone_H and Tone_LM. Optimism is a 
measure of net optimism14 counted using a dictionary in Diction 6. 15 Hilary et al. (2016) use 
Diction to construct Optimism scores for earnings press releases in 8-K filings as a measure of 
managerial optimism. Tone_H and Tone_LM are two wordlists developed by Henry (2008) 
and Loughran and McDonald (LM) (2011) respectively to measure positive and negative 
words especially in a financial context. In particular, Tone_H and Tone_LM are calculated as 
the ratio of the difference between positive and negative words to the sum of positive and 
                                            
14 In Diction, optimism is defined as “language endorsing some person, group, concept or event, or highlighting 
their positive entailments”. 
15 As a unique feature of Diction software, there is standardization procedure when calculating a particular item. 
In particular, we compare our collected Chairman’s Statements to three alternative norms in Diction including 
(1) all cases, (2) corporate financial reports and (3) corporate public relations. Our empirical results are 
qualitatively similar using alternative norms.  
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negative words.16 Lee, Hwang and Chen (2017) use the LM wordlist to measure managerial 
optimism based on CEO tweets and earnings conference calls. Besides, we also use another 
tone measure, namely Net_Emotion17, which is measured using dictionaries in Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2007.  
        Our individual tone measures are based on two types of word lists, namely business and 
non-business word lists. Among these lists, Tone_H and Tone_LM are designed for business 
communication and thus might be more appropriate in the accounting and finance fields, 
while the Diction and LIWC word lists are widely used in the literature (e.g., Rogers et al., 
2011; Davis et al., 2015). Loughran and McDonald (2015) argue that the Diction word lists 
are inappropriate for measuring tone of business communication, although they find that the 
Diction and LM negative words are highly correlated. However, strictly speaking, the LM 
lists are not perfect either because they are developed based on the US 10-K filings which 
include mandatory disclosures and are subject to various disclosure requirements, while our 
content analysis focuses on the voluntary disclosures in the UK annual reports which are 
relatively less regulated. Another potential limitation of the LM lists is that their negative 
words may capture financial constraints (Bodnaruk et al., 2015) which could potentially drive 
the tone-leverage relation.  
        Considering the potential limitations of the above individual tone measures, it might not 
be a good idea to rely heavily on a single tone measure in our empirical analysis. Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) form a composite index of investor sentiment based on six individual 
sentiment proxies. Investor sentiment is an equally difficult to quantify construct as 
managerial optimism, and as argued by Baker and Wurgler (2006) there are no perfect and 
uncontroversial individual sentiment proxies. For a similar reason, we form a composite index 
                                            
16 The terms “positive/negative” and “optimistic/pessimistic” are often used interchangeably in the literature 
(e.g., Davis, Piger and Sedor, 2012). Li (2010b) standardize the terms to “positive/negative” instead of 
“optimistic/pessimistic”.  
17 An earlier version of LIWC has a category named “optimism”, however in the 2007 version words are 
classified more broadly into “positive emotion” and “negative emotion”.  
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of optimistic tone using principal component analysis (PCA). Specifically, we define 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)*  as the first principal components of the correlation matrix of four raw tone 
measures. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 2.55, 18 explains 63.7 percent of our 
sample variance.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)* = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)0 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋)0*4056  (1) 
 
where, 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋)0* represent individual tone measure j of firm i in fiscal year t. 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)0 is 
the loading for individual tone measure j of firm i. The loadings for Net_Emotion, Optimism, 
Tone_H, and Tone_LM are 0.50, 0.44, 0.50, and 0.55 respectively.  
        It is worth noting that, following most studies on disclosure tone (e.g., Rogers et al., 
2011; Davis et al., 2015)19, our tone measures are equal-weighted. Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) implement a term weighting scheme (i.e. term frequency-inverse document frequency 
(tf-idf)) to construct the weighted tone measures. However, this is not always necessary. The 
term weighting, commonly used in the information retrieval literature, modifies the impact of 
a word based on its frequency not only within a document but also within the entire corpus, in 
which case the impact of a word that appears in most of the documents will be significantly 
attenuated. The weighted tone measures are thus sample-dependent, meaning that the tone 
measure of a given document depends on the other documents in the sample.20  This is 
considered as the most negative aspect of the weighting scheme partly because it impedes 
replication (Henry and Leone, 2016). Henry and Leone (2016) further argue that “studies that 
                                            
18 The eigenvalue indicates the amount of variation explained by each principal component (PC). The eigenvalue 
of the first PC is the highest. A PC with an eigenvalue above one suggests that the PC accounts for more 
variance than one of the individual tone measures. The eigenvalue of our first PC is well above one. The 
eigenvalue of second component is below one (i.e. 0.66).  
19 Also see footnote 1 in Henry and Leone (2016) for a list of studies using tone measures with equal weighting. 
20 If we use a weighted tone measure as our proxy for overconfidence, we implicitly assume that the degree of 
overconfidence of one manager, indicated by his/her own words, depends on the words used by other managers 
in other documents. This assumption is, however, difficult to justify. 
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focus on analysing the content of an already-identified set of documents obviously do not 
need to employ tools aimed at locating the documents and ranking their relevance” and 
conclude that term weighting advocated in Loughran and McDonald (2011) is “arguably less 
relevant and potentially distorts tone scores”.  
 
3.2 THE SAMPLE AND STATISTICS 
Data used in this study are from the following sources. The UK firms’ financial data is 
obtained from Thomson Worldscope database. Chairman’s Statements are manually collected 
from the company annual reports which are downloaded either through Northcote website or 
directly from company websites. Insider trading data is from Hemmington Scott database. Our 
sample of unbalanced panel data is constructed as follows. The selection of sample period is 
guided by data availability. All financial and utility firms are excluded. Firm observations 
with missing financial data are excluded. To conduct tone analysis, we need the digital 
version of the UK company annual reports, so that the Chairman’s Statement can be readable 
by the content analysis software (i.e. LIWC 2007 and Diction 6)21. In addition, to construct 
insider trading-based measure of optimism, only those firms with insider transactions in any 
year during our sample period are selected. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to eliminate the effect of outliers. The final sample comprises 452 firms and 2236 
observations during the period 1998-2011.  
        Table 1 Panel A presents summary statistics of our main variables. The means of book 
and market leverage are 0.177 and 0.135, respectively. The mean of firm size (i.e. logarithm 
of sales) is 12.307 with a standard deviation of 2.250. Our sample seems to be representative 
in terms of firm size. Table 1 Panel B shows the pairwise Pearson correlations matrix. TONE 
                                            
21 In terms of the procedure of content analysis, we first extract Chairman’s Statements from annual report. Next, 
we detect transformation errors in the combined text file using the Spelling & Grammar function in Microsoft 
Word 2010. Finally, various types of errors are corrected before the texts are inputted in the LIWC and Diction 
software.  
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is strongly positively correlated with the four individual tone measures, Net_Emotion, 
Optimism, Tone_H, and Tone_LM. Regarding the correlations between optimism measures 
and leverage, TONE is negatively related to book and market leverage. Cash is positively 
associated with TONE and negatively associated with both book and market leverage. 
Dividend yield and dividend payout are negatively associated with TONE and positively 
associated with both book and market leverage. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 OPTIMISTIC TONE AND LEVERAGE  
This section examines the influence of managerial optimism, as measured by managerial 
optimistic tone, on leverage, controlling for standard capital structure determinants. In 
particular, we use the following model to test the impact of the level of optimism on leverage:  
 𝐿𝐸𝑉)* = 𝑎 + 𝑏6𝑀𝑂)* + 𝐵>𝑿)* + 𝑣) + 𝜇* + 𝑒)*                                                (2) 
 
where, 𝐿𝐸𝑉)*  is book or market leverage ratio.22 𝑀𝑂)*  is a proxy for managerial optimism. 
Following previous studies on capital structure (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 
2009; Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011), 𝑿)* is a vector of an extensive set of determinants of 
leverage including market-to-book ratio (MB), firm size, tangibility, profitability, non-debt 
tax shields, tax rate, price performance, firm age, dividend dummy, Capex, R&D intensity, 
and positive and negative financing deficits (PDEF/NA and NDEF/NA). The measure of 
financing deficits (DEF) is proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In particular, the 
positive DEF (PDEF) measures financing deficits and indicates the need for external 
                                            
22 Our results are robust to an alternative leverage measure (i.e. long-term debt/total assets). 
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financing, while negative DEF (NDEF) measures financing surplus and suggests that there is 
sufficient internal funds. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. 𝑣)  is time-invariant 
firm-specific effects. 𝜇* is year fixed effects. 𝑒)* is the error term. We use fixed effects (FE) 
within estimator to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
        Table 2 reports the results for leverage regressions (Equation (2)). All the tone-based 
optimism measures are negatively associated with both market leverage (see Panel A in Table 
2) and book leverage (see Panel B in Table 2). The coefficients on the tone index, TONE, and 
four individual tone measures, Tone_H, Tone_LM, Net_Emotion and Optimism, are all 
negative and statistically significant at 1% or 5% level in all specifications. The estimated 
effect of tone on leverage is sizable. For example, if Tone_LM increases from 0 to 1, 
indicating a higher level of managerial optimism, market leverage and book leverage will 
decrease by around 2.9 and 1.5 percent respectively. This observation is consistent with the 
proposition that managerial optimism may cause debt conservatism (hypothesis 1b). Our 
subsequent subsample analysis (see Section 4.3) investigates whether the negative tone-
leverage relation is subject to alternative interpretations (e.g. information asymmetry, 
impression management and financial constraints). 
        One may ask whether the negative relation between tone and leverage can be explained 
by reverse causality. In particular, high leverage (or overleveraged) firms, according to trade-
off theory, will probably need to adjust down their leverage by issuing equity in the next 
fiscal year. In this case, overleveraged firms will use optimistic tone to reduce the information 
cost of equity. Another form of reverse causality is that overleveraged firms, in order to 
counteract potential unfavourable analyst reports and credit rating downgrade associated with 
high leverage, will use optimistic tone. These two forms of reverse causality imply that high 
leverage may cause more optimistic tone, suggesting a positive tone-leverage relation, which 
is however not consistent with our empirical finding.  
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        Among the firm-level controls, the coefficients on tangibility and firm size are positive, 
while the coefficients on profitability, non-debt tax shields, price performance, dividend 
dummy, and Capex are negative. Tangibility is positively related to leverage, which can be 
explained by the fact that collateral makes debt financing easier. Firm size is also positively 
related to leverage, which is consistent with the notion that large firms have better reputations 
and lower bankruptcy risk and are therefore use more debt. However, this finding is 
inconsistent with pecking order prediction that firm size, as a proxy for information cost, 
should be positively related to equity issuance. The negative effect of profitability on leverage 
can be attributed to profitable firms’ pecking order preference for internal financing over debt 
financing. Non-debt tax shields significantly reduces leverage, because it substitutes for the 
tax shield benefits of debt. Price performance significantly reduces leverage, consistent with 
market timing argument that firms tend to issue more equities when the stock price is high. 
Dividend dummy significantly reduces leverage, largely because dividend payments reduce 
information asymmetry and thus increases equity financing. Capex also significantly reduces 
leverage, consistent with the view that capital expenditures as a proxy for growth 
opportunities may exacerbate debt-related agency costs and thus reduces debt financing. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.2 OPTIMISTIC TONE AND LEVERAGE IN FIRST DIFFERENCES 
Next, we provide further evidence on hypothesis 1b by examining the impacts of changes in 
managerial optimism (i.e. the time-varying component of optimistic tone) on the changes of 
leverage. We run Equation (2) in first differences23, where, all variables are fiscal year-on-
year changes of the level variables in Equation (2). Table 3 reports the results from leverage 
regression in first differences. The dependent variables are market leverage and book leverage 
                                            
23 Similarly, Frank and Goyal (2003) also run leverage regressions in first differences. However, they point out 
that this specification may bias the coefficient estimates towards zero and has a lower R2.  
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respectively in Panel A and B. The coefficients on the changes of all the tone-based optimism 
measures are negative and statistically significant at 1% or 5% level, except Columns (2) and 
(3) in Panel B where the coefficients are negative but insignificant. These findings largely 
confirm the negative relation between the level of optimistic tone and leverage. In addition, 
we find consistent results with our previous findings (in Section 4.1) for most of the control 
variables including ∆ PDEF/NA (+), ∆ NDEF/NA (+), ∆ firm size (+), ∆ tangibility (+), ∆profitability (-), ∆non-debt tax shields (-), and ∆price performance (-). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.3 IS THE NEGATIVE TONE-LEVERAGE RELATION SUBJECT TO ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS? 
This section mainly attempts to distinguish between rational and behavioural interpretations 
of optimistic tone: information asymmetry and impression management vs. managerial 
optimism. We examine the extent to which the significance of tone-leverage relation varies 
with proxies for information asymmetry and information environment. Firm size is closely 
related to both information asymmetry and impression management. Small firms have higher 
information asymmetry problem and are followed by fewer analysts. Lang and Lundholm 
(2000) examine whether voluntary disclosure prior to equity offerings are used to reduce 
information asymmetry or hype the stock. For this research purpose, their sample is limited to 
small firms. The reason is that small firms followed by fewer analysts are more likely to use 
disclosure to “influence market perceptions”24 (Lang and Lundholm, 2000). In contrast, large 
firms followed by many analysts are expected to provide more transparent and high-quality 
disclosures (García Osma and Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). This proposition is supported by 
                                            
24 Another reason why small firms are more likely to engage in impression management is related to Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2006) proposition that smaller firms are relatively more “hard-to-value” and are therefore more 
influenced by investor sentiment. The implication is that investment decisions of irrational investors with high 
sentiment are more easily influenced by impression management. This is because irrational investors are less 
able to undo biased reporting, which offers small firms more scope for impression management. 
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García Osma and Guillamón-Saorín’s (2011) empirical evidence that firm size and number of 
analysts following the firm, as proxies for information environment, are negatively associated 
with impression management (e.g. manually coded disclosure tone). In brief, small firms have 
more incentive to not only reduce information asymmetry but also manipulate investors’ 
impression, using unbiased and biased reporting respectively.  
        Therefore, considering the relation between firm size and the two rational explanations 
of tone (i.e. information asymmetry and impression management) discussed above, if our 
optimistic tone influences leverage through these two rational channels, we would expect that 
the negative tone-leverage relation will be much stronger for smaller firms. Inconsistent with 
this conjecture, in Table 4 Panel A we find that the negative relation between tone and market 
leverage is statistically more significant for the large (i.e. top quartile) firms, although the 
magnitude of the coefficients on the tone index is slightly higher for the small (i.e. bottom 
quartile) firms. However, it should be noted that firm size is not a perfect proxy for 
information asymmetry. Therefore, in what follows we attempt to use several alternative, 
albeit imperfect, measures of information asymmetry to further investigate whether the tone-
leverage relation is subject to alternative explanations especially information asymmetry.  
        In Panel B-F of Table 4, we split the sample based on firm age, MB, R&D, and dividend. 
We believe that the firms that are younger, have higher MB, are more R&D intensive, and do 
not pay dividend have higher information asymmetry problem. If information asymmetry is 
the main channel through which tone reduces leverage, we would expect that the tone-
leverage relation is much more statistically and economically significant for these types of 
firms. This is however not the case. In particular, Panel B shows that the tone index is only 
statistically significant for old firms in Column (2). In Panel C, the effect of tone is more 
significant for the low growth firms. In Panel D, the tone-leverage relation is much more 
significant for firms with zero R&D investments. In Panel E, the negative tone-leverage 
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relation is statistically more significant for dividend payers. These findings from Panel B-E 
are all inconsistent with the information asymmetry channel.  
        To sum up, the subsample analysis in Table 4 seems to suggest that the significant tone-
leverage relation is less likely to be driven by either information asymmetry or impression 
management.25 In other words, our results from the subsample analysis favour the managerial 
optimism perspective of tone.26  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5. Further Analysis and Robustness Checks 
5.1 OPTIMISTIC TONE AND CASH HOLDINGS 
We further investigate the potential channel through which managerial optimism leads to 
lower leverage. A key mechanism in hypothesis 1b is that optimistic managers who believe 
that external financing is unduly costly tend to hold more cash for future investment. The 
resulting higher cash holdings in turn makes firms with optimistic managers rely less on debt 
financing and thus have lower leverage. We test the effect of our tone-based measures of 
managerial optimism on cash holdings using the following model: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻)* = 𝑎 + 𝑏6𝑀𝑂)* + 𝐵>𝑿)* + 𝑣) + 𝜇* + 𝑒)*                                                (3) 
 
                                            
25 In addition, to further mitigate the concern that our tone measures capture soft information about future firm 
performance, we control for future performance by including the profitability of year t+1 and t+2 in our 
regression. In untabulated results, we find that the negative tone-leverage relation is still significant, suggesting 
that this relation is almost unlikely to be driven by soft information.  
26 One may argue that investors and analysts may not read Chairman’s Statement once they have started to invest 
or follow. If this is the case, it may help to rule out the two alternative interpretations of tone that are related to 
information asymmetry and impression management respectively. This is because tone would not be effective in 
reducing information asymmetry or be used for manipulation of investors’ impression if investors do not closely 
read and analyse the Chairman’s Statements. In contrast, the Chairman’s Statements (and other corporate 
disclosure) can still be used to gauge biased managerial beliefs even if investors do not read them. 
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where, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻)* is cash divided by total assets. 𝑀𝑂)* is a proxy for managerial optimism. 𝑿)* is 
a vector of firm-level control variables including market-to-book ratio, firm size, tangibility, 
profitability, capital expenditure, dividend and firm age. 𝑣)  is time-invariant firm-specific 
effects. 𝜇*  is year fixed effects. 𝑒)*  is the error term. We use fixed effects (FE) within 
estimator. In Table 5 Panel A, we find that the tone index, TONE has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on cash holdings at 10% level. In addition, the coefficients on 
two individual tone measures, Tone_LM and Net_Emotion, are also positive and statistically 
significant at 1% or 5% level. The significant positive relation between the tone-based 
measures of managerial optimism and cash holdings suggests that a main reason why 
managerial optimism is negatively associated with leverage is that optimistic managers tend 
to hold more cash and therefore use debt conservatively.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5.2 OPTIMISTIC TONE AND DIVIDEND PAYMENT 
Decreasing dividend payment can reduce a firm’s demand for external financing. If a manager 
is optimistic about future investment opportunity, the manager will retain more earnings and 
reduce dividend payment to meet future financing needs. As predicted by Deshmukh, Goel 
and Howe’s (2013) model, optimistic managers, who overestimate the value of new 
investments, view external financing as costly will try to build financial slack by decreasing 
dividend payment. The negative relation between managerial optimism and dividend payment 
can help explain the negative tone-leverage relation, because lower dividend payment can 
make the firm rely less on debt financing. We therefore test the effect of our tone-based 
measures of managerial optimism on dividend payment using the following model: 
 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷)* = 𝑎 + 𝑏6𝑀𝑂)* + 𝐵>𝑿)* + 𝑣) + 𝜇* + 𝑒)*                                                (4) 
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where, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷)*  is a proxy for dividend policy. We use dividend yield and dividend 
payout as two alternative dependent variables. 𝑀𝑂)* is a proxy for managerial optimism. 𝑿)* 
is a vector of firm-level control variables including market-to-book ratio, firm size, tangibility, 
profitability, capital expenditure and firm age. 𝑣) is time-invariant firm-specific effects. 𝜇* is 
year fixed effects. 𝑒)* is the error term. We use fixed effects (FE) within estimator. In Table 5, 
the dependent variables in Panel B and C are dividend yield and dividend payout respectively. 
In panel C, we exclude observations with negative earnings per share. Almost all the tone-
based measures of managerial optimism have negative and statistically highly significant (at 1% 
level) effects on both dividend yield and dividend payout. The significant negative relation 
between optimism and dividend payment suggests that one reason why optimistic managers 
rely less on debt financing is that they pay lower dividend.  
 
5.3 THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING ON THE TONE-LEVERAGE 
RELATION27 
This section further explores the empirical implications of the interactions between optimistic 
tone and insider trading for leverage. The insider trading patterns of the managers may reflect 
their perceptions of firms’ prospects (Jenter, 2005). Optimistic managers tend to overestimate 
the firm value and hence are more willing to purchase their own stocks. This trading 
behaviour can be considered as managers’ market timing in their personal portfolios. The 
main purpose of examining the interactions between optimistic tone and insider trading is to 
                                            
27 This section focuses on the moderating effect of insider trading on the tone-leverage relation. In untabulated 
analysis, we also examine the direct effect of insider trading on leverage. The effects of CEO and CFO trading 
dummies on leverage are mixed. Only the coefficients on CFO_NPR(1) and CEO_NPR(-1) are significant at 10% 
level and the signs of the trading dummies are somewhat sensitive to the model specifications. These weak and 
mixed results related to the insider trading-leverage relation is perhaps not surprising considering the possibility 
that insider trading measures may be contaminated by information asymmetry. Untabulated subsample analysis 
shows that the insider trading-leverage relation is stronger for smaller, intangible and younger firms which have 
higher information costs, suggesting that insider trading may capture information asymmetry.  
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make an empirical distinction between impression management (i.e. intentionally misinform 
investors) and optimism (i.e. unintentionally misinform investors) perspectives of tone.  
        We follow the empirical strategies of Staw et al. (1983) and Abrahamson and Park 
(1994), in which the association between impression management and insider sales is 
examined. Specifically, if positive tone is associated with subsequent stock sales by firm 
directors, it is highly likely that positive tone is used consciously to manipulate investors’ 
perception. On the other hand, the interaction between positive tone and high net purchase is 
an indication of managerial optimism, meaning that managerial optimism contributes to both 
positive tone and insider purchases. Put differently, a combination of highly optimistic tone 
and high net purchase indicates optimism. In this case, managerial optimism leads to 
managers misinforming investors unconsciously by using optimistic tone. To test the joint 
effect of optimistic tone and insider trading, similar to Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011)28 
we interact tone measures with an indicator of abnormal insider trading as follows:  
 𝐿𝐸𝑉)* = 𝑎 + 𝑏6𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸)*+𝑏>𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀)*+𝑏L𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀)* ∗ 𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸)* + 𝐵4𝑿)* + 𝑣) + 𝑒)*    (5) 
 
where, 𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀)* is an indicator of either pure insider purchase or pure insider selling. To 
capture the insider trading patterns of the managers, we construct the net purchase ratio (NPR) 
as follows: 𝑁𝑃𝑅)* = MNOPQRSTUUPQMNOPQVSTUUPQ, where, 𝑁𝑃𝑅)* is the NPR of managers (i.e. CEO and CFO) 
of firm 𝑖 in fiscal year 𝑡. 𝐵𝑢𝑦)* is the aggregate volume of insider purchases and 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙)* are the 
aggregate volume of insider sales. The indicator of pure insider purchase takes the value one 
if the net purchase ratio is 1 and 0 otherwise. The indicator of pure insider selling takes the 
value one if the net purchase ratio is -1 and zero otherwise. We expect 𝑏L in Equation (5) to 
                                            
28  Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) examine the combined effects of optimistic tone of earnings 
announcements and insider trading in the context of shareholder litigation. They report that the interaction 
between optimism and abnormal insider selling will increase litigation risk. The reason for the increased 
likelihood of being sued is that insider selling contradicts optimistic disclosure tone. 
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be negative (hypothesis 2) if the 𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀)* is an indicator of pure insider purchase, and 𝑏L 
to be positive (hypothesis 3) if the 𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀)* is an indicator of pure insider selling. The 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the above regression models suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a concern.  
        Table 6 Panel A reports the results for leverage regressions with interaction effects of 
tone and an indicator of pure insider purchase. CEO_NPR(1) and CFO_NPR(1) are two 
dummy variables that take the value one if NPRs of CEO and CFO respectively are 1 and 0 
otherwise. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the coefficients on the interaction between 
CEO_NPR(1) and tone measures are negative and statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that optimistic tone has more negative impacts on leverage especially when CEOs 
engage in the pure purchase of their firm’s stocks. The interaction between CFO_NPR(1) and 
tone measures are also negative but statistically insignificant.  
        Table 6 Panel B reports the results for leverage regressions with interaction effects of 
tone and an indicator of pure insider selling. CEO_NPR(-1) and CFO_NPR(-1) are two 
dummy variables that take the value one if NPRs of CEO and CFO respectively are -1 and 
zero otherwise. Consistent with hypothesis 3, the coefficients on the interaction between 
CEO_NPR(-1) and tone measures are positive and statistically significant. The above findings 
suggest that CEO selling could weaken the negative effects of optimistic tone on leverage.  
        To interpret the above interaction effects between insider trading and tone, the negative 
coefficients on the interaction between insider purchase dummy and tone support the 
managerial optimism channel: high insider purchase activities suggest that optimistic tone is a 
strong indicator of managerial optimism, and thus high insider purchase enhance the negative 
relation between optimistic tone and leverage (hypothesis 2). On the other hand, the positive 
coefficients on the interaction between insider selling dummy and tone are also consistent 
with the managerial optimism story: high insider selling activities suggest that optimistic tone 
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is a weak indicator of managerial optimism. In the presence of high insider selling, it is likely 
that optimistic tone is used to intentionally manage investors’ impression rather than reflects 
managerial optimism. Consequently, the presence of high insider selling is associated with the 
weaker negative relation between optimistic tone and leverage (hypothesis 3). In brief, insider 
trading patterns indicate how strong optimistic tone is as a measure of managerial optimism 
and therefore have significant moderating effects on the tone-leverage relation.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5.4 EVIDENCE BASED ON ALTERNATIVE TONE MEASURES 
This section examines whether our evidence is robust to alternative measures of optimistic 
tone in Table 7. The dependent variables are market leverage and book leverage respectively 
in Panel A and B. First, to address the concern that the raw tone measures might be 
contaminated by firm-specific variables29 , a composite index of the orthogonalized tone 
measures is constructed. We first regress each individual tone measure on a list of firm 
characteristics: 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋)0* = 𝛼 + 𝐵6𝑿)* + 𝜀)0* , where, 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋)0*  represents four individual 
tone measures. 𝑿)*is a vector of the control variables in Equation (2). 𝜀)0* is the corresponding 
orthogonalized individual tone measures. Next, a composite index (𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)*]) is formed 
based on the first principal component of four residuals (i.e. 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋)0*] = 𝜀)0*) from the above 
regressions. The first component explains 61.8 percent of the sample variance.30 In Column (1) 
of Panel A and B, we find that the orthogonalized tone index, TONE_RES, significantly 
decreases the market leverage and book leverage at 1% level.  
                                            
29 In terms of the determinants of tone (e.g., current performance, growth opportunities, operating risks and 
complexity), Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2014) find that tone, as measured using Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
wordlist, is positively related to market-to-book and volatility of stock returns and negatively related to firm size, 
age and number of business segments.  
30 The eigenvalues of first and second components are 2.47 and 0.68 respectively. The loadings for the four 
orthogonalized individual tone measures are similar to those in Equation (1).  
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        In Columns (2) and (3), we examine the effects of positive and negative tone on leverage 
separately. This exercise is partly motivated by the fact that the Loughran and McDonald 
word lists include much more negative words and thus may be biased towards negative 
information. More importantly, these negative words may reflect financial constraints 
(Bodnaruk et al., 2015). Recall our subsample analysis in Table 4, the negative tone-leverage 
relation is statistically less significant for younger firms and non-dividend payers which tend 
to be financially constrained. This evidence suggests that our results are not driven by 
financial constraints. However, one may argue that firm age and dividend are not perfect 
indicators of financial constraints (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016).  
        To further address these concerns, we test the effects of positive words and negative 
words on leverage separately. We expect that positive tone significantly reduces leverage, 
while the negative tone has the opposite effect. As expected, Columns (2) and (3) show that 
the coefficients on positive tone (POS_Tone_LM) and negative tone (NEG_Tone_LM) are 
significantly negative and positive respectively.  
        In Columns (4)-(8), instead of using Chairman’s Statement, we use an alternative 
corporate disclosure, that is, the texts written by CEOs (henceforth called CEO’s Reviews), to 
derive proxies for managerial optimism.31 The purpose of using the alternative tone measures 
based on CEO’s Reviews is to address the concern that the tone of Chairman’s Statement may 
                                            
31 We need to manually collect texts written by CEOs from the annual reports and save them as text files. This is 
a nontrivial and tedious task for several reasons. First, the titles of the texts written by CEOs are highly 
heterogeneous across firms and may even change over time for the same firm. Alternative titles frequently used 
by our sample firms include Chief Executive’s Review/Report/Statement/Letter/Summary, 
Operating/Operational/Operations Review, Review of Operations, Operating/Operational and Financial Review, 
Business Review, Managing Director’s Review/Report, among others, some of which (e.g. 
Operating/Operational Review, Review of Operations, Operating and Financial Review, Business Review) may 
or may not be written by CEOs. Second, it is difficult to identify the start and/or the end of the CEO’s Reviews. 
For example, the signature of CEO does not always indicate the end of the Review. Third, not all texts on the 
pages of CEO’s Reviews are written by CEOs. Some case studies or descriptions of pictures may be presented 
on the same pages but are not written by CEOs. Finally, some firms do not have CEO’s Reviews. To accurately 
identify the texts written by the CEOs, we first check the content page of each annual report and then manually 
check each page of the CEO’s Reviews to make sure that only the texts written by CEOs are included in our 
content analysis. In addition to the heterogeneous nature of the titles, the content, structure, and length of CEO’s 
Reviews can also be highly heterogeneous both across and within firms, which could potentially make the tone 
of CEO’s Reviews noisy.  
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only reflect the belief of the chairman but not the chief executives. The sample size becomes 
smaller using these alternative tone measure because some firms do not have CEO’s Reviews. 
Columns (4)-(8) of Panel A show that all the composite and individual measures of the tone 
of the CEO’s Reviews, CEO TONE, CEO Tone_H, CEO Tone_LM, CEO Net_emotion, and 
CEO Optimism significantly decreases the market leverage at 1% level. The effects of these 
tone measures on the book leverage in Panel B are relatively less significant. Specifically, 
CEO TONE and CEO Optimism significantly decrease book leverage at 5% level, and CEO 
Tone_LM significantly decrease book leverage at 10% level. Overall, the negative tone-
leverage relation is highly robust to alternative tone measures.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5.5 FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
Our main finding of a significant negative tone-leverage relation survives an extensive series 
of robustness checks presented in Table 8. The dependent variables in Panel A and B are 
market and book leverage respectively. In Column (1), to alleviate the concern that our tone 
measures might be endogenous, we use the two-step system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) to estimate a dynamic partial adjustment model where we include a lagged dependent 
variable to take the dynamic adjustment of leverage into consideration. All the explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. The coefficient on TONE is negative and statistically 
significant at 5% level32. In Column (2), in an attempt to mitigate the concern of reverse 
causality that leverage drives tone, we regress leverage on the lagged tone and other lagged 
control variables. The coefficient on the lagged tone is negative and statistically significant at 
1% level. In Column (3), we use logit model to test the impact of managerial optimism on the 
likelihood of firm-years with low leverage (i.e. below 5%). We find that the tone index 
                                            
32 We check our model specifications using autocorrelation tests and Hansen test. In particular, the null of no 
second order autocorrelation fails to be rejected. Hansen test fails to reject the null of instrument validity.  
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significantly increases the probability of low leverage at 1% level. In Column (4), we use 
random-effects Tobit (RE-Tobit) estimator, which is superior since it accounts for the 
fractional nature of our dependent variable, and the result is qualitatively similar.  
        In Column (5), the result still holds if we re-run the leverage regression with double-
clustered standard errors by firm and year to allow for correlations among different firms 
(years) in the same year (firm). In Column (6), we use Fama-MacBeth (F-M) cross-sectional 
regression to obtain a yearly average of the effect of tone on leverage, our tone index still has 
a significantly negative effect on leverage. Finally, around 31.8 percent of the sample firms 
are on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and are smaller and relatively less regulated 
than those on the Main Market. In Columns (7)-(8), we find consistent results across these 
two markets, suggesting that the results based on the full sample are not driven by the 
regulatory differences between these two markets. The above results in Panel A are confirmed 
using book leverage as a dependent variable in Panel B. Thus, the observed negative tone-
leverage relation is highly robust.33 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the capital structure literature by i) examining the link between time-
varying managerial optimism and leverage in detail and ii) providing evidence that high 
managerial optimism is associated with debt conservatism (i.e. the low leverage puzzle). 
Hence, time-varying managerial optimism can help explain the low leverage puzzle. We 
construct a time-varying managerial words-based optimism measure, namely optimistic tone, 
based on the computational linguistic analysis of UK corporate disclosure. We find that 
                                            
33 In addition, in untabulated results, controlling for CEO duality, a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO 
of a firm holds the position of the chairman and zero otherwise, the negative tone-leverage relation is still 
statistically highly significant, suggesting that our baseline results are not driven by CEO duality. 
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managerial optimistic tone has a highly significant and negative impact on leverage. Our new 
evidence supports Malmendier et al.’s (2011) proposition that managerial optimism, defined 
as the overestimation of mean future cash flows, is associated with debt conservatism. The 
evidence is highly robust to alternative tone measures constructed using CEO’s Review. 
Further analysis shows that the negative tone-leverage relation seems not to be driven by 
information asymmetry, impression management or financial constraints. We also provide 
further evidence that supports the debt conservatism explanation for the negative tone-
leverage relation. Optimistic tone has a significantly positive effect on cash holdings and a 
significantly negative effect on dividend payment, suggesting that a key reason why firms 
with optimistic managers have lower leverage is that these firms hold more cash and pay less 
dividend and thus rely less on external financing.  
        Finally, we further extend prior work by examining the effects of the interaction between 
managerial words (i.e. tone) and actions (i.e. insider trading) on leverage. When insider 
selling contradicts optimistic tone; this suggests that managers are not as optimistic as their 
tone suggests and are engaging in impression management; in such circumstances we find the 
negative tone-leverage relationship is weakened. In contrast, insider purchase, which confirms 
optimistic tone generally intensifies the negative tone-leverage relation further supporting the 
managerial optimism interpretation. Overall, this study suggests that time-varying managerial 
optimism, gauged from their words, is an important driver of conservative debt policy. This 
study has two major implications for future research. First, our composite tone-based measure 
of optimism can be adopted in studies on time-varying managerial optimism. Second, it will 
be interesting to examine the joint effect of managerial “words” and “actions” on other 
corporate financial policies and events.  
37 
 
References 
Abrahamson, E. and Park, C. (1994). Concealment of negative organizational outcomes: an 
agency theory perspective, Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1302-1334. 
Adelberg, A.H. (1979). Narrative disclosures contained in financial reports: means of 
communication or manipulation, Accounting and Business Research, 9(35), 179-189.  
Amernic, J.H. and Craig, R.J. (2007). Guidelines for CEO-speak: editing the language of 
corporate leadership, Strategy & Leadership, 35(3), 25-31. 
Baginski, S.P., Hassell, J.M. and Hillison, W.A. (2000). Voluntary causal disclosures: 
tendencies and capital market reaction, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
15(4), 371-89. 
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. (2006). Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns, 
Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1645-1680. 
Bodnaruk, A., Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2015). Using 10-K text to gauge financial 
constraints, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50(4), 623-646. 
Brennan, N.M. and Conroy, J.P. (2013). Executive hubris: the case of a bank CEO, 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 26(2), 172-195. 
Campbell, T.C., Gallmeyer, M., Johnson, S.A., Rutherford, J. and Stanley, B.W. (2011). CEO 
optimism and forced turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), 695-712. 
Carver, C.S., Scheier, M.F. and Weintraub, J.K. (1989). Assessing coping strategies: a 
theoretically based approach, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(2), 267-
283. 
Carver, C.S. and Scheier, M.F. (2002). Optimism. In Snyder, C.R. and Lopez, S.J. (Eds.), 
Handbook of Positive Psychology (pp. 231-243). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Clatworthy, M. and Jones, M.J. (2003). Financial reporting of good news and bad news: 
evidence from accounting narratives, Accounting and Business Research, 33(3), 171-
185. 
Clatworthy, M.A. and Jones, M.J. (2006). Differential patterns of textual characteristics and 
company performance in the chairman's statement, Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 19(4), 493-511. 
Craig, R.J. and Amernic, J.H. (2011). Detecting linguistic traces of destructive narcissism at-
a-distance in a CEO’s letter to shareholders, Journal of Business Ethics, 101(4), 563-
575. 
Davis, A.K., Ge, W., Matsumoto, D. and Zhang, L. (2015). The effect of manager-specific 
optimism on the tone of earnings conference calls, Review of Accounting Studies, 20(2), 
639-673. 
Davis, A.K., Piger, J.M. and Sedor, L.M. (2012). Beyond the numbers: measuring the 
information content of earnings press release language, Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 29(3), 845-868. 
Davis, A.K. and Tama-Sweet, I. (2012). Managers’ use of language across alternative 
disclosure outlets: earnings press releases versus MD&A, Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 29(3), 804-837. 
Deshmukh, S., Goel, A.M. and Howe, K.M. (2013). CEO overconfidence and dividend policy, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(3), 440-463. 
Diamond, D. and Verrecchia, R. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital, Journal 
of Finance, 46(4), 1325-1355.  
Doukas, J.A. and Petmezas, D. (2007). Acquisitions, overconfident managers and self-
attribution bias, European Financial Management, 13(3), 531-577. 
Dykema, J., Bergbower, K. and Peterson, C. (1995). Pessimistic explanatory style, stress, and 
illness, Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 14(4), 357-371. 
38 
 
Easley, D. and O’Hara, M. (2004). Information and the cost of capital, Journal of Finance, 
59(4), 1553-1583.  
Eshraghi, A. and Taffler, R. (2012). Fund manager overconfidence and investment 
performance: evidence from mutual funds, Working Paper, University of Edinburgh and 
Warwick Business School. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. (2002). Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about 
dividends and debt, Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 1-33. 
Farre-Mensa, J. and Ljungqvist, A. (2016). Do measures of financial constraints measure 
financial constraints?, Review of Financial Studies, 29(2), 271-308. 
Feldman, R., Govindaraj, S., Livnat, J. and Segal, B. (2010). Management’s tone change, post 
earnings announcement drift and accruals, Review of Accounting Studies, 15(4), 915-
953. 
Frank, M.Z. and Goyal, V.K. (2003). Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 67(2), 217-248. 
Frank, M.Z. and Goyal, V.K. (2009). Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably 
important?, Financial Management, 38(1), 1-37. 
García Osma, B. and Guillamón-Saorín, E. (2011). Corporate governance and impression 
management in annual results press releases, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
36(4), 187-208. 
Garrard, P., Rentoumi, V., Lambert, C. and Owen, D. (2014). Linguistic biomarkers of hubris 
syndrome, Cortex, 55, 167-181. 
Goel, A.M. and Thakor, A.V. (2008). Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate 
governance, Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2737-2784. 
Graham, J.R. (2000). How big are the tax benefits of debt?, Journal of Finance, 55(5), 1901-
1941. 
Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R. and Puri, M. (2013). Managerial attitudes and corporate actions, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 109(1), 103-121.  
Hackbarth, D. (2008). Managerial traits and capital structure decisions, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 43(4), 843-882.  
Heaton, J.B. (2002). Managerial optimism and corporate finance, Financial Management, Vol. 
31(2), 33-45.  
Henry, E. (2008). Are investors influenced by how earnings press releases are written? 
Journal of Business Communication, 45(4), 363-407.  
Henry, E. and Leone, A.J. (2016). Measuring qualitative information in capital markets 
research: comparison of alternative methodologies to measure disclosure tone, 
Accounting Review, 91(1), 153-178. 
Hilary, G., Hsu, C., Segal, B. and Wang, R. (2016). The bright side of managerial over-
optimism, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 62(1), 46-64. 
Hirshleifer, D., Low, A. and Teoh. S.H. (2012). Are overconfident CEOs better innovators?, 
Journal of Finance, 67(4), 1457-1498. 
Hribar, P. and Yang, H. (2016). CEO overconfidence and management forecasting, 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 33(1), 204-227. 
Huang, X., Teoh, S.H. and Zhang, Y. (2014). Tone management, Accounting Review, 89(3), 
1083-1113.  
Huang-Meier, W., Lambertides, N. and Steeley, J.M. (2016). Motives for corporate cash 
holdings: the CEO optimism effect, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
47(3), 699-732. 
Jenter, D. (2005). Market timing and managerial portfolio decisions, Journal of Finance, 
60(4), 1903-1949.  
39 
 
Jin, L. and Kothari, S.P. (2008). Effect of personal taxes on managers' decisions to sell their 
stock, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1), 23-46.  
Kearney, C. and Liu, S. (2014). Textual sentiment in finance: a survey of methods and models, 
International Review of Financial Analysis, 33, 171-185. 
Koonce, L., Seybert, N. and Smith, J. (2011). Causal reasoning in financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 36(4), 209-225. 
Kothari, S.P., Li, X. and Short, J.E. (2009). The effects of disclosures by management, 
analysts, and business press on cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts: a 
study using content analysis, Accounting Review, 84(5), 1639-1670.  
Lang, M.H. and Lundholm, R.J. (2000). Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: reducing 
information asymmetry or hyping the stock?, Contemporary Accounting Research, 
17(4), 623-662.  
Larcker, D.F. and Zakolyukina, A.A. (2012). Detecting deceptive discussions in conference 
calls, Journal of Accounting Research, 50(2), 495-540. 
Lee, J.M., Hwang, B.H. and Chen, H. (2017). Are founder CEOs more overconfident than 
professional CEOs? Evidence from S&P 1500 companies, Strategic Management 
Journal, 38(3), 751-769. 
Li, F. (2010a). Textual analysis of corporate disclosures: a survey of the literature, Journal of 
Accounting Literature, 29, 143-165. 
Li, F. (2010b). The information content of forward-looking statements in corporate filings-a 
naïve bayesian machine learning approach, Journal of Accounting Research, 48(5), 
1049-1102. 
Libby, R., and Rennekamp, K. (2012). Self-serving attributional bias, overconfidence and the 
issuance of management forecasts, Journal of Accounting Research, 50(1), 197-231. 
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2011). When is a liability not a liability? Textual analysis, 
dictionaries, and 10-Ks, Journal of Finance, 66(1), 35-65.  
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2015). The use of word lists in textual analysis, Journal of 
Behavioral Finance, 16(1), 1-11. 
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2016). Textual analysis in accounting and finance: A survey, 
Journal of Accounting Research, 54(4), 1187-1230. 
Malmendier, U. and Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment, Journal 
of Finance, 60(6), 2661-2700. 
Malmendier, U., and Tate. G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the 
market’s reaction, Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1), 20-43. 
Malmendier, U., Tate, G. and Yan, J. (2011). Overconfidence and early-life experiences: the 
effect of managerial traits on corporate financial policies, Journal of Finance, 66(5), 
1687-1733. 
Merkl-Davies, D.M. and Brennan, N.M. (2007). Discretionary disclosure strategies in 
corporate narratives: incremental information or impression management?, Journal of 
Accounting Literature, 26, 116-196.  
Merkl-Davies, D.M., and Brennan, N.M. (2011). A conceptual framework of impression 
management: new insights from psychology, sociology and critical perspectives, 
Accounting and Business Research, 41(5), 415-437. 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the 
theory of investment, American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297. 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H. (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a 
correction, American Economic Review, 53(3), 433-443. 
Moore, D.A. and Healy, P.J. (2008). The trouble with overconfidence, Psychological Review, 
115(2), 502-517. 
40 
 
Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N.S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics, 
13(2), 187-221. 
Peterson, C. and Steen, T.A. (2002). Optimistic Explanatory Style. In Snyder, C.R. and Lopez, 
S.J. (Eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology (pp. 244-256). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Price, S.M., Doran, J.S., Peterson, D.R. and Bliss, B.A. (2012). Earnings conference calls and 
stock returns: The incremental informativeness of textual tone, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 36(4), 992-1011. 
Rogers, J.L., Van Buskirk, A. and Zechman, S.L. (2011). Disclosure tone and shareholder 
litigation, Accounting Review, 86(6), 2155-2183. 
Scheier, M.F., Weintraub, J.K. and Carver, C.S. (1986). Coping with stress: divergent 
strategies of optimists and pessimists, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
51(6), 1257-1264. 
Scheier, M.F., Carver, C.S. and Bridges, M.W. (1994). Distinguishing optimism from 
neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): a reevaluation of the Life 
Orientation Test, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1063-1078. 
Seligman, M.E. (2006). Learned optimism: How to change your mind and your life (1st 
Vintage Books ed.). 
Schleicher, T. and Walker, M. (2010). Bias in the tone of forward-looking narratives, 
Accounting and Business Research, 40(4), 371-390. 
Schrand, C.M., and Zechman, S.L.C. (2012). Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope 
to financial misreporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(1/2), 311-329. 
Shyam-Sunder, L. and Myers, S.C. (1999). Testing static tradeoff against pecking order 
models of capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 51(2), 219-244. 
Staw, B.M., McKechnie, P.I. and Puffer, S.M. (1983). The justification of organizational 
performance, Administrative Science Quarterly, 28(4), 582-600. 
Smith, M. and Taffler, R.J. (2000). The chairman’s statement-A content analysis of 
discretionary narrative disclosures, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
13(5), 624-647. 
Strebulaev, I.A. and Yang, B. (2013). The mystery of zero-leverage firms, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 109(1), 1-23. 
Weinstein, N.D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 39, 806-820. 
 
 
41 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Pane A presents the descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent variables. Panel B shows 
Pearson correlation coefficients between all pairs of our main variables. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Median Max. 
Market leverage 2236 0.135 0.129 0.000 0.108 0.523 
Book leverage 2236 0.177 0.152 0.000 0.165 0.606 
Cash 2223 0.105 0.121 0.000 0.062 0.628 
Dividend yield 2236 0.029 0.031 0.000 0.024 0.163 
Dividend payout 1762 0.542 0.605 0.000 0.414 3.857 
PDEF/NA 2236 0.113 0.306 0.000 0.000 2.027 
NDEF/NA 2236 -0.033 0.070 -0.430 0.000 0.000 
MB 2236 1.768 1.267 0.562 1.404 8.786 
Firm size 2236 12.307 2.250 6.144 12.487 16.870 
Tangibility 2236 0.255 0.227 0.005 0.193 0.894 
Profitability 2236 0.090 0.183 -0.884 0.121 0.386 
Firm age 2236 5.654 1.016 3.526 5.568 7.286 
Non-debt tax shields 2236 0.033 0.026 0.001 0.027 0.139 
Tax rate 2236 0.225 0.350 -1.615 0.278 1.643 
Price performance 2236 -0.004 0.537 -1.877 0.081 1.169 
Dividend dummy 2236 0.765 0.424 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Capex 2236 0.045 0.045 0.001 0.032 0.253 
R&D intensity  2236 0.096 0.453 0.000 0.000 3.831 
TONE 2236 -0.018 1.599 -5.679 0.162 3.614 
Net_emotion 2236 0.733 0.168 0.223 0.752 1.000 
Optimism 2236 53.501 2.063 49.430 53.320 60.160 
Tone_H 2236 0.714 0.231 -0.056 0.765 1.000 
Tone_LM 2236 0.554 0.293 -0.287 0.595 1.000 
CEO_NPR(1) 1297 0.613 0.487 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CEO_NPR(-1) 1297 0.186 0.389 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CFO_NPR(1) 1046 0.675 0.469 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CFO_NPR(-1) 1046 0.156 0.363 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Market leverage 1.00       
2. Book leverage 0.88 1.00      
3. Cash -0.43 -0.44 1.00     
4. Dividend yield 0.27 0.19 -0.19 1.00    
5. Dividend payout 0.09 0.11 -0.09 0.35 1.00   
6. TONE -0.21 -0.06 0.04 -0.20 -0.16 1.00  
7. Net_emotion -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 0.80 1.00 
8. Optimism -0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 0.70 0.45 
9. Tone_H -0.25 -0.10 0.10 -0.25 -0.15 0.80 0.50 
10. Tone_LM -0.22 -0.09 0.08 -0.21 -0.13 0.88 0.60 
11. CEO_NPR(1) 0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.12 
12. CEO_NPR(-1) -0.17 -0.11 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 0.11 0.08 
13. CFO_NPR(1) 0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 
14. CFO_NPR(-1) -0.14 -0.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 0.13 0.11 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
8. Optimism 1.00       
9. Tone_H 0.36 1.00      
10. Tone_LM 0.51 0.66 1.00     
11. CEO_NPR(1) -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 1.00    
12. CEO_NPR(-1) 0.07 0.09 0.10 -0.60 1.00   
13. CFO_NPR(1) -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 0.60 -0.47 1.00  
14. CFO_NPR(-1) 0.07 0.10 0.13 -0.43 0.66 -0.62 1.00 
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Table 2. Optimistic tone and leverage 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with market and book leverage as dependent variables in Panel 
A and B respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Constants are included but not reported. 
Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: market leverage 
Variables  (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE 
TONE -0.007***     
 (0.000)     
Tone_H  -0.037***    
  (0.000)    
Tone_LM   -0.029***   
   (0.000)   
Net_emotion    -0.049***  
    (0.000)  
Optimism     -0.003*** 
     (0.000) 
PDEF/NA 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
NDEF/NA 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
MB -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.250) (0.178) (0.212) (0.256) (0.278) 
Firm size 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitability -0.083*** -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.096*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-debt tax shields -0.775*** -0.760*** -0.743*** -0.759*** -0.744*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax rate -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.239) (0.247) (0.199) (0.249) (0.186) 
Price performance -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.947) (0.940) (0.897) (0.997) (0.981) 
Dividend dummy -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex -0.263*** -0.258*** -0.268*** -0.266*** -0.272*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D intensity 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 
 (0.628) (0.782) (0.644) (0.641) (0.838) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.318 0.311 0.311 0.309 0.308 
Obs. 2236 2236 2236 2236 2236 
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(Continued from the previous page) 
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: book leverage 
Variables  (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE 
TONE -0.005***     
 (0.000)     
Tone_H  -0.018**    
  (0.016)    
Tone_LM   -0.015***   
   (0.009)   
Net_emotion    -0.041***  
    (0.001)  
Optimism     -0.002*** 
     (0.007) 
PDEF/NA 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NDEF/NA 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MB 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.406) (0.447) (0.429) (0.391) (0.388) 
Firm size 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Tangibility 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Profitability -0.066** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.067** -0.073*** 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) 
Non-debt tax shields -0.472* -0.457* -0.450* -0.471* -0.455* 
 (0.063) (0.077) (0.078) (0.060) (0.073) 
Tax rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.604) (0.596) (0.560) (0.634) (0.546) 
Price performance -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.244) (0.246) (0.235) (0.262) (0.256) 
Dividend dummy -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) 
Capex -0.182** -0.181** -0.186** -0.183** -0.189** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) 
R&D intensity 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 
 (0.351) (0.435) (0.370) (0.310) (0.481) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.136 0.131 0.131 0.136 0.133 
Obs. 2236 2236 2236 2236 2236 
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Table 3. Leverage regression in first differences 
This table presents leverage regressions in first differences with market and book leverage as dependent 
variables. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Constants are included but not reported. Standard errors 
are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: market leverage change 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS ∆TONE -0.004***     
 (0.000)     ∆Tone_H  -0.022***    
  (0.000)    ∆Tone_LM   -0.013***   
 
  (0.003)   ∆Net_emotion    -0.032***  
    (0.000)  ∆Optimism     -0.002*** 
 
    (0.001) ∆PDEF/NA 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆NDEF/NA 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆MB 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.120) (0.128) (0.153) (0.109) (0.131) ∆Firm size 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) ∆Tangibility 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) ∆Profitability -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.068*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆Non-debt tax shields -0.836*** -0.848*** -0.836*** -0.842*** -0.836*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆Tax rate -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.183) (0.227) (0.164) (0.219) (0.151) ∆Price performance -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆Firm age 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.011 
 (0.753) (0.668) (0.701) (0.723) (0.685) ∆Dividend dummy -0.014* -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* -0.014* 
 (0.075) (0.090) (0.082) (0.084) (0.074) ∆Capex -0.183*** -0.172*** -0.184*** -0.186*** -0.186*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) ∆R&D intensity 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.742) (0.741) (0.859) (0.767) (0.917) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.365 0.363 0.359 0.362 0.360 
Obs. 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
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(Continued from the previous page) 
 
Panel B. Dependent variable: book leverage change 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS ∆TONE -0.002**     
 (0.015)     ∆Tone_H  -0.007    
  (0.186)    ∆Tone_LM   -0.005   
   (0.242)   ∆Net_emotion    -0.019**  
    (0.023)  ∆Optimism     -0.001** 
     (0.028) ∆PDEF/NA 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆NDEF/NA 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆MB -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.463) (0.451) (0.433) (0.485) (0.471) ∆Firm size 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.012* 
 (0.085) (0.080) (0.083) (0.072) (0.091) ∆Tangibility 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.186*** 0.187*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) ∆Profitability -0.079*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.079*** -0.082*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ∆Non-debt tax shields -0.629*** -0.634*** -0.629*** -0.632*** -0.627*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) ∆Tax rate -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005* 
 (0.108) (0.117) (0.103) (0.121) (0.093) ∆Price performance -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) ∆Firm age -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.626) (0.669) (0.655) (0.628) (0.643) ∆Dividend dummy -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.499) (0.526) (0.516) (0.517) (0.475) ∆Capex -0.096 -0.092 -0.096 -0.098 -0.098 
 (0.126) (0.142) (0.126) (0.120) (0.117) ∆R&D intensity 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.564) (0.589) (0.617) (0.563) (0.635) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2  0.177 0.175 0.175 0.177 0.177 
Obs. 1609 1609 1609 1609 1609 
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Table 4. Subsample analysis of the tone-leverage relation 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with market and book leverage as dependent variables. 
Subsamples split based on firm size, firm age, market-to-book, R&D intensity, and dividend dummy respectively 
are estimated to examine the impacts of information asymmetry and information environment on the tone-
leverage relation. In Panel A, “Small Quartile” and “Large Quartile” consist of the smallest and largest (in terms 
of total assets) observations from the bottom and top quartile respectively. In Panel B, “Young Quartile” and 
“Old Quartile” consist of the youngest and oldest observations from the bottom and top quartile respectively. In 
Panel C, “HighMB Quartile” and “LowMB Quartile” consist of observations with highest and lowest MB ratio 
from the top and bottom quartile respectively. In Panel D, “Positive R&D” and “Zero R&D” consist of 
observations with positive and zero R&D respectively. In Panel E, “Non-dividend payer” and “Dividend payer” 
consist of observations with zero and positive dividend payment respectively. All control variables and constants 
are included but not reported. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-
level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  
market leverage (Column 1-2) 
Dependent variable:  
book leverage (Column 3-4) 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE 
Panel A. firm size Small Quartile Large Quartile Small Quartile Large Quartile 
TONE -0.007** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.004* 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.090) Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.179  0.522 0.109  0.251 
Obs. 559 559 559 559 
Panel B. firm age Young Quartile Old Quartile Young Quartile Old Quartile 
TONE -0.004 -0.007*** -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.117) (0.004) (0.245) (0.101) Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.270 0.482 0.181  0.211 
Obs. 561 559 561 559 
Panel C. market-to-book HighMB Quartile LowMB Quartile HighMB Quartile LowMB Quartile 
TONE -0.002 -0.013*** -0.004** -0.010*** 
 (0.242) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.198 0.316 0.160 0.234 
Obs. 559 559 559 559 
Panel D. R&D intensity Positive R&D Zero R&D  Positive R&D Zero R&D  
TONE -0.005** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.005*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.180) (0.002) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.304 0.364 0.139 0.191 
Obs. 998 1238 998 1238 
Panel E. dividend  Non-divined payer Dividend payer Non-divined payer Dividend payer 
TONE -0.007** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.004*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.024) (0.003) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.291 0.401 0.191 0.205 
Obs. 526 1710 526 1710 
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Table 5. Optimistic tone and other firm policies 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with cash/total assets, dividend yield, and dividend payout as 
dependent variables in Panel A, B, and C respectively. In Panel C, firm-year observations with negative earnings 
per share are excluded. The control variables in Panel A include MB, firm size, tangibility, profitability, Capex, 
firm age, and dividend dummy. In Panel B and C we control for all these variables except the dividend dummy. 
All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Constants are included but not reported. Standard errors are 
adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: cash/total assets 
Variables  (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE 
TONE 0.003*     
 (0.050)     
Tone_H  0.000    
  (0.991)    
Tone_LM   0.016**   
   (0.022)   
Net_emotion    0.040***  
    (0.005)  
Optimism     0.001 
     (0.312) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.088 0.086 0.088 0.091 0.086 
Obs. 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223 
Panel B. Dependent variable: dividend yield=common dividend/market capitalization 
Variables  (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE 
TONE -0.004***     
 (0.000)     
Tone_H  -0.023***    
  (0.000)    
Tone_LM   -0.017***   
   (0.000)   
Net_emotion    -0.020***  
    (0.000)  
Optimism     -0.002*** 
     (0.000) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.183 0.180 0.174 0.158 0.160 
Obs. 2236 2236 2236 2236 2236 
Panel C. Dependent variable: dividend payout=dividend per share/earnings per share 
Variables  (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE 
TONE -0.052***     
 (0.000)     
Tone_H  -0.194**    
  (0.014)    
Tone_LM   -0.211***   
   (0.001)   
Net_emotion    -0.501***  
    (0.001)  
Optimism     -0.021*** 
     (0.002) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.209 0.201 0.205 0.209 0.201 
Obs. 1762 1762 1762 1762 1762 
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Table 6. The moderating effect of insider trading on the tone-leverage relation 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with market and book leverage as dependent variables. In Panel 
A, interactions between indicators of pure insider purchase (i.e. CEO_NPR(1) and CFO_NPR(1)) and tone are 
included in all regressions. In Panel B, interactions between indicators of pure insider selling (i.e. CEO_NPR(-1) 
and CFO_NPR(-1)) and tone are included in all regressions. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Constants are included but not reported. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. The moderating effect of insider purchase on the tone-leverage relation 
 
Dependent variable: market leverage  
(Column 1-2) 
Dependent variable: book leverage  
(Column 3-4) 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE 
TONE -0.002 -0.005** -0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.326) (0.049) (0.679) (0.302) 
CEO_NPR(1) -0.001 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.884) 
 
(0.931) 
 CEO_NPR(1)*TONE -0.006*** 
 
-0.005** 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.027) 
 CFO_NPR(1) 
 
0.007 
 
0.011* 
  
(0.215) 
 
(0.077) 
CFO_NPR(1)*TONE 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
  
(0.412) 
 
(0.541) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.413 0.432 0.171 0.205 
Obs. 1297 1046 1297 1046 
Panel B. The moderating effect of insider selling on the tone-leverage relation 
 
Dependent variable: market leverage  
(Column 1-2) 
Dependent variable: book leverage  
(Column 3-4) 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE 
TONE -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009) 
CEO_NPR(-1) -0.005  -0.000  
 (0.262)  (0.973)  
CEO_NPR(-1)*TONE 0.007***  0.008**  
 (0.009)  (0.050)  
CFO_NPR(-1)  -0.010  -0.002 
  (0.154)  (0.759) 
CFO_NPR(-1)*TONE  0.005  0.007 
  (0.207)  (0.174) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.412 0.433 0.171 0.203 
Obs. 1297 1046 1297 1046 
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Table 7. Alternative tone measures and leverage 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with market and book leverage as dependent variables in Panel 
A and B respectively. The tone measures in Columns (1)-(3) are constructed using Chairman’s Statement. 
TONE_RES is an orthogonalized tone index. POS_Tone_LM is based on the positive words in the LM word list. 
NEG_Tone_LM is based on the negative words in the LM word list. The tone measures in Columns (4)-(8) are 
constructed using CEO’s Review. CEO TONE, CEO Tone_H, CEO Tone_LM, CEO Net_emotion, and CEO 
Optimism are equivalent to TONE, Tone_H, Tone_LM, Net_emotion, and Optimism respectively but are 
constructed using CEO’s Review. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Constants are included but not 
reported. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: market leverage 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
TONE_RES -0.007***        
 (0.000)        
POS_Tone_LM  -0.001***       
  (0.000)       
NEG_Tone_LM   0.002***      
   (0.000)      
CEO TONE    -0.007***     
    (0.000)     
CEO Tone_H     -0.046***    
     (0.001)    
CEO Tone_LM      -0.031***   
      (0.002)   
CEO Net_emotion       -0.045***  
       (0.001)  
CEO Optimism        -0.002*** 
        (0.004) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.318 0.305 0.307 0.350 0.347 0.344 0.344 0.343 
Obs. 2236 2236 2236 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 
Panel B. Dependent variable: book leverage 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
TONE_RES -0.004***        
 (0.000)        
POS_Tone_LM  -0.001**       
  (0.015)       
NEG_Tone_LM   0.001*      
   (0.080)      
CEO TONE    -0.004**     
    (0.025)     
CEO Tone_H     -0.021    
     (0.155)    
CEO Tone_LM      -0.019*   
      (0.071)   
CEO Net_emotion       -0.022  
       (0.195)  
CEO Optimism        -0.002** 
        (0.014) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.136 0.131 0.130 0.189 0.186 0.187 0.186 0.189 
Obs. 2236 2236 2236 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 
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Table 8. Further robustness tests 
This table presents a series of robustness tests with market and book leverage as dependent variables. In model 
(1) we use two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. All explanatory variables are 
treated as endogenous, which are instrumented using lags 2 or 3. In model (2) we regress leverage on all the 
lagged independent variables (Lagged Xs). In model (3) we use logistic regression (Logit) where the dependent 
variable is one if the leverage ratio is below 5% and zero otherwise. In model (4) we use the random-effects 
Tobit regression (RE-Tobit). In model (5) the standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering (Cluster2) 
within firm and year. In model (6) we use Fama-MacBeth (F-M) regression. In models (7) and (8) we compare 
two subsamples of firms in the Main Market and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) respectively. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Constants are included but not reported. P-values are given in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: market leverage 
 (1) GMM (2) Lagged Xs (3) Logit (low leverage) (4) RE-Tobit 
TONE -0.004** -0.010*** 0.125*** -0.008*** 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Lag leverage 0.775***    
 (0.000)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No No 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes 
R2  0.242   
Log likelihood   -949.19 2078.50 
Obs. 1609 1609 2236 2236 
 (5) Cluster2 (6) F-M (7) Main Market (8) AIM 
TONE -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
R2 0.410 0.590 0.369 0.228 
Obs. 2236 2236 1698 538 
Panel B. Dependent variable: book leverage 
 (1) GMM (2) Lagged Xs (3) Logit (low leverage) (4) RE-Tobit 
TONE -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.100** -0.005*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) 
Lag leverage 0.793***    
 (0.000)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No No 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes 
R2  0.109   
Log likelihood   -941.09 1812.96 
Obs. 1609 1609 2236 2236 
 (5) Cluster2 (6) F-M (7) Main Market (8) AIM 
TONE -0.007*** -0.010** -0.004*** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.002) (0.011) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No No 
R2 0.374 0.555 0.154 0.169 
Obs. 2236 2236 1698 538 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Book leverage Total debt divided by total assets 
Market leverage Total debt divided by (total assets minus common equity plus market capitalization) 
Cash Cash divided by total assets  
Dividend yield Common dividend divided by market capitalization  
Dividend payout Dividend per share divided by earnings per share (observations with negative earnings 
per share are excluded) 
DEF Financing deficit is the sum of net debt issues (i.e. long-term borrowings minus 
reduction in long-term debt) and net equity issues (i.e. net proceeds from sale/issue of 
common and preferred stocks minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted).  
PDEF/NA PDEF divided by net assets (total assets-current liabilities), where PDEF equals DEF if 
the deficit is positive and zero otherwise 
NDEF/NA NDEF divided by net assets (total assets-current liabilities), where NDEF equals DEF 
if the deficit is negative and zero otherwise 
Firm size Natural logarithm of sales 
M/B The ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
equity to book value of total assets  
Profitability Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by total assets 
Tangibility  Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
Firm age The natural logarithm of the number of months since the incorporation date 
Non-debt tax shields Depreciation divided by total assets 
Tax rate Income taxes divided by pre-tax income 
Price performance  The difference of natural logarithm of fiscal year-end share prices 
Dividend dummy Dummy=1 if common dividend is positive, and 0 otherwise 
R&D intensity Research and development (R&D) divided by sales (missing R&D values are set equal 
to zero) 
Capex Capital expenditure divided by total assets  
Net_emotion (positive emotion-negative emotion)/(positive emotion+negative emotion) as defined 
by LIWC 
Optimism [praise+satisfaction+inspiration]-[blame+hardship+denial] as defined by Diction 
Tone_H (positive words-negative words)/(positive words+negative words), using Henry’s 
(2008) word list  
Tone_LM (positive words-negative words)/(positive words+negative words), using Loughran 
and McDonald’s (2011) word list 
TONE Composite tone index (see Section 3.1.1 for more descriptions) based on four 
individual tone measures  
TONE_RES Orthogonalized tone index (see Section 5.4 for more descriptions) based on four 
individual orthogonalized tone measures  
POS_Tone_LM The proportion of positive words from the Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) word 
list, constructed using Chairman’s Statement 
NEG_Tone_LM The proportion of negative words from the Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) word 
list, constructed using Chairman’s Statement 
CEO_NPR(1) Dummy=1 if the net purchase ratio (NPR=(buy-sell)/(buy+sell)) of CEO is 1, and 0 
otherwise (see Section 3.1.2 for more descriptions) 
CEO_NPR(-1) Dummy=1 if the net purchase ratio (NPR=(buy-sell)/(buy+sell)) of CEO is -1, and 0 
otherwise (see Section 3.1.2 for more descriptions) 
CFO_NPR(1) Dummy=1 if the net purchase ratio (NPR=(buy-sell)/(buy+sell)) of CFO is 1, and 0 
otherwise (see Section 3.1.2 for more descriptions) 
CFO_NPR(-1) Dummy=1 if the net purchase ratio (NPR=(buy-sell)/(buy+sell)) of CFO is -1, and 0 
otherwise (see Section 3.1.2 for more descriptions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
